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Aversion to norm-breaking: A model
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Abstract
In experimental games, we observe the following phenomena: (1) many subjects cooperate contrary to 
their material interest, (2) they cooperate in a reciprocal manner, (3) subjects often punish those others 
who behave unkindly, and (4) previous history usually influences subjects’ choices. We propose a simple 
game-theoretical model to account for these and other experimental phenomena, and compare it with other 
models of social preferences and reciprocity.
JEL classification: C70; C72; D63; D64; D74; Z13
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Introduction
Experimental Economics offers abundant evidence—see Fehr and Schmidt (2006) and
Camerer (2003) for excellent surveys—that contradicts the joint hypothesis that all agents are
rational and motivated only by their own material interest. In a Dictator game experiment, for
instance, one subject is provisionally endowed with some money and must decide how much of
that money to transfer to another (anonymous) participant. Clearly, a rational and selfish
chooser would not transfer anything. Contrary to that prediction, a significant proportion of the
partici-pants give something, many times as much as half of the stake.
The Ultimatum game, another well-known experimental game, provides additional evidence
in this line. This game has the same structure as the dictator game except that the second player
(the ‘responder’) has now a say and can accept or reject the first mover’s proposal of sharing.
The proposal is implemented if the responder accepts it, whereas both players get zero money
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if it is rejected. Obviously, the rejection of a strictly positive offer goes against material interest. 
However, actual responders usually reject offers of less than one quarter of the stake and even 
more.
These results are proof that (some) people cooperate (or behave generously toward others)
and punish contrary to their material interest. Why do cooperation and punishment occur? The
dictator’s decision problem and the responder’s one are so simple that an argument based on
rationality failures seems rather convoluted. On the contrary, introspection suggests that moti-
vational forces different from material interest play here a crucial role. This paper investigates
formally such motivations in order to offer a rational choice explanation of subjects’ behavior in
this and many other experiments.
We believe that the aforementioned phenomena can be explained by resorting to social norms
and emotions. Human societies are endowed with social norms that people internalize through
the education process. In this way, people acquire certain emotional responses to others’ and
one’s behavior (Elster, 1999; Gintis, 2000). On the one hand, self-conscious emotions like em-
barrassment, guilt or shame trigger when oneself deviates from an internalized norm. On the
other hand, people feel aggressive emotions like anger when another player violates a norm
that one has hitherto respected. These painful emotions shape human preferences because, other
things constant, one prefers not to suffer them. In turn, norm internalization affects human behav-
ior in two distinctive ways. First, people adjust their choices to prevent the activation of the above
mentioned negative emotions. Second, specific behavioral impulses appear associated with such
sensations once they get triggered (Frijda, 1986)—the action tendency of anger, for instance, is
to punish the deviator.
As a result, emotions crucially shape norm compliance and punishment in human soci-
eties: People respect norms to avoid bad feelings (internal punishment), external sanctions
(external punishment), or both, whereas, in addition, human punishment is often driven by
aggressive emotions. Some recent neurological evidence is consistent with the idea that emo-
tions induce punishing behavior. Sanfey et al. (2003), for instance, scanned responders’ brains
in the ultimatum game and found that rejection of low offers was correlated with heightened
activity in the anterior insula (a brain area thought to be related to emotions like anger). In
addition, self-reported questionnaires of emotional states suggest that emotions like shame,
guilt or anger play an important role in decision making (Bosman and van Winden, 2002;
Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004).
From our point of view, the generosity and the Pareto-damaging behavior that (some) sub-
jects exhibit in the Dictator and Ultimatum games, respectively, may be explained by the theory
sketched in the two previous paragraphs. The argument is simple: (Some) subjects have inter-
nalized a specific norm of fairness or distributive justice which they take to the lab, and then
their emotions make them act according to the norm and punish transgressors. Intuitively, these
principled subjects also affect the behavior of the remaining, self-interested, agents which may
find profitable to respect the norm if they risk being sanctioned otherwise. This paper provides a
formalization of this theory.
We analyze the working of the model in different strategic settings like the Dictator game,
Cournot game, Ultimatum game, Best-Shot game, Trust game, Centipede game, and Market
games, and show that it is more consistent with experimental evidence than the standard homo
economicus model. Although this may be debatable, we also believe that our model has several
advantages over other models of social preferences and reciprocity, among which we may cite
some. First, it is very general: One may use it not only to understand why people respect fairness
norms, but also why they follow dressing norms, codes of etiquette, or honesty norms, which
other models have difficulties to explain. Second, and contrary to some other models, it is a model
of path-dependent preferences: Players care about their material payoff, but also about how they
get it. This appears to be largely consistent with experimental evidence—again, consult Fehr and
Schmidt (2006) or Camerer (2003). Third, and consistent with the extensive evidence provided
by Charness and Rabin (2002), the model predicts two apparently contradictory phenomena:
(i) many subjects have both social efficiency and equality concerns, and (ii) many subjects engage
in Pareto-damaging behavior to punish deviators. Last, but not least, it is relatively parsimonious
because it assumes that players do just care about their co-players’ behavior, not about their
motives for such behavior—i.e., their intentions. This contrasts with other models of reciprocity,
which assume that players care about their co-players’ beliefs or types and thus have to resort
to the Psychological Game Theory of Geanakoplos et al. (1989) or to signaling arguments that
complicate much the analysis.
In order to avoid misunderstandings, let us be very clear on one point: We do not have any
doubt that intentions are important to explain decision making. Therefore, our model is unreal-
istic in this regard. However, we believe that this is compensated by the fact that the model is
relatively simple and (yet) empirically relevant. This latter feature is remarkable: Our model can
explain the kind of experimental phenomena that have been usually associated with intentions,
that is, (1) previously non-chosen alternatives influence behavior, and (2) players treat differently
passive and active co-players in certain circumstances and in a way that contradicts the assump-
tion that players only care about the distribution of material payoffs. In this sense, our paper
might contribute new insights to the debate on when intentions affect behavior.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We devote the next section to survey some
of the literature on social preferences. To distinguish the effects of prosocial and aggressive emo-
tions on behavior, Section 3 first describes prosocial preferences and Section 4 applies this model
to different experimental games, comparing theoretical predictions with experimental data. Sec-
tion 5 adds aggressive emotions to the model and studies other experimental games. Throughout
Sections 4 and 5, we point out the differences between our approach and that of other models.
Finally, Section 6 proposes some possible extensions and concludes.
Other models of social preferences and reciprocity
However the pervasiveness of the homo economicus hypothesis, the idea that people have
social emotions has an old history in Economics. Edgeworth (1881) proposed a simple model of
altruism in which an individual’s utility is a weighted sum of her and others’ material payoffs.
This linear formulation is rich enough to express many ideas. To describe it in game theoretical
terms, assume for simplicity that player i’s material payoff at terminal node z coincides with her
money earnings xi(z). Player i’s utility at z is then
Ui(z) = xi(z) +
∑
k =i
αik(z) · xk(z), (1)
where αik(z) ∈ [−1,1] for any i, k, and z. Of course, the homo economicus hypothesis entails
αik(z) = 0 for any i, k and z. On the opposite, it is said that player i is altruistic toward player k
at z if αik(z) > 0, and spiteful toward k if αik(z) < 0.
In the simplest formulation within this linear framework, αik(z) is the same constant number
for any k and z. This means that the sign and intensity of our sentiments or emotions toward
the others do not depend on their acts, qualities, and beliefs, or on the actual distribution of
material payoffs. However, in an important and pioneering paper, Rabin (1993) put into question
the previous formulation, providing an alternative model. Rabin pointed out that the sign of our
sentiments is conditional: “[. . . ] the same people who are altruistic to other altruistic people are
also motivated to hurt those who hurt them.”1 Moreover, he posited that the sign of our sentiments
depends on our beliefs about the others’ intentions.
Roughly speaking, player B’s intentions are her expectations about the terminal distribution
of material payoffs to be reached in the game. Take then any two-player game in normal form and
suppose that A believes that B’s intentions are (x∗A,x∗B). B’s intentions are kind (unkind) to A if
x∗A is larger (smaller) than the equitable payoff—i.e., the average of the maximum and minimum
A’s payments within the set of Pareto efficient allocations that, according to A, B believes to be
reachable. In a somewhat analogous way, B is kind (unkind) to A if she expects A to get a higher
(lower) payoff than what B believes to be A’s equitable payoff. Now, a player’s utility is the sum
of her expected material payoff and a reciprocity component that is bounded above and below,2
and which Rabin uses to model conditional altruism: A’s reciprocity component is positive if
A treats B kindly (unkindly) when she believes that B’s intentions are kind (unkind). Rabin
(1993) resort to Psychological Game Theory—Geanakoplos et al. (1989)—to model the idea that
beliefs about the other player’s intentions affect utility, and proposes, in line with that theory, an
equilibrium concept in which players’ strategies are optimal given their beliefs which, moreover,
turn out to be correct.3 Nevertheless, his solution concept is problematic in sequential games
where non-optimizing behavior may be prescribed out of the equilibrium path. Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2004) extend Rabin’s approach to n-player extensive form games and provide a
solution concept that follows the logic of subgame perfect equilibrium.
It follows from Rabin’s definition of the equitable payoff, the reference point that players use
to judge whether intentions are kind or not, that the whole set of allocations—including those
outcomes that the other player does not intend to reach—might affect one’s behavior, something
that is generally compatible with experimental evidence. On the other hand, two assumptions
of Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) are largely incompatible with exper-
imental evidence. First, the equitable payoff is independent of the opponent’s expected payoffs
which implies, for instance, that if (2.1, 0) and (2, 2) are the only Pareto efficient material alloca-
tions and the second player’s intentions are (2, 2)—i.e., he has unkind intentions toward the first
player—then the first player might be willing to hurt the second one, if possible. A second short-
coming is that dummy players, which cannot have kind or unkind intentions, are never treated
kindly (or unkindly). For instance, both models predict no giving in the dictator game.4
Falk and Fischbacher (2006) propose another extension of Rabin (1993) to extensive form
games that avoids those two problems. In it, a player’s utility at a terminal node z is the sum
of the material payoff at z and the reciprocity utilities that she gets at all her decision nodes
that precede z—players may weight such reciprocity utilities differently, thus introducing het-
erogeneity. The chooser’s reciprocity utility at decision node n depends on her beliefs at n
about the opponents’ intentions. As in Rabin (1993), kind intentions trigger ceteris paribus
reward whereas unkind intentions trigger punishment. Contrary to Rabin (1993), however, in-
tentions are kind (unkind) at n when the other player gets a lower (higher) expected material
payoff than oneself’s. Another key distinction from Rabin’s model is that the intensity with
which agent A’s wishes to punish or reward B depends on the whole set of outcomes that
1 Rabin (1993, p. 1281), italics in the original.
2 Hence, the bigger the material payoffs, the less the players’ behavior reflects their concern for fairness.
3 Note well that, sensibly, beliefs are fixed exogenously and are not an object of choice.
4 Nevertheless, Appendix A of Rabin (1993) extends the main model to avoid this problem.
A believes that B believes to be reachable. Roughly, A’s disposition to reward B lessens
if A believes that, although B has kind intentions, B could have given more to A at any
other available alternative. Conversely, A’s disposition to punish B lessens if A believes that,
although B has unkind intentions, B could not have given more to A at any other alterna-
tive.
Models using Psychological Game Theory are based on the interesting idea that social emo-
tions depend on the motives we attribute to others. However, they share the drawback of being
rather complex. Levine (1998) improves tractability by assuming that people are concerned about
the opponent’s type and not about his intentions. A typical agent A’s type is completely specified
by a number aA ∈ (−1,1), which signals whether someone is benevolent (aA > 0) or malevolent
(aB < 0). Given this, and using the linear framework of Eq. (1), αAB(z) depends positively on
aA and aB . For example, even if player A is benevolent, she may become spiteful (αAB < 0)
toward a sufficiently malevolent player B . Since the type of each player is private information,
there is a possibility for signaling, that is, players’ actions may reveal how benevolent (or malev-
olent) they are, and their opponents care about this. In that way, non-chosen moves may be as
important as the moves one actually chooses, something that, as we have already remarked, is
sensible and consistent with experimental evidence. One drawback of this model is that it renders
a multiplicity of equilibrium strategy profiles in most games.
The Appendix of Charness and Rabin (2002) offers another model of reciprocity. They intro-
duce a demerit profile d = (d1, . . . , dn), where dj ∈ [0,1] for all j , and nonnegative parameters
λ, δ, b, k, f where λ ∈ [0,1] and δ ∈ (0,1). Player i’s utility function is
Ui = (1 − λ) · xi + λ
[
δ · min
(
xi,min
k =i {xk + bdk}
)
+ (1 − δ)
(
xi +
∑
k =i
max{1 − kdk,0} · xk
)
− f
∑
k =i
dk · xk
]
.
The key aspect of these preferences is that the greater is dk for k = i, the less weight player i
places on player k’s material payoff. In fact, if f and dk are sufficiently large then player i wishes
to hurt player k. In order to model reciprocity, Charness and Rabin endogenize each demerit dj
to make it dependent on player j ’s strategy. Roughly speaking, they define gi(si , s−i , d) as a
correspondence selecting those values of λ ∈ [0,1] such that si is a best response to s−i given
demerits d . Each gi(si , s−i , d) is then compared with an exogenous ‘selflessness standard’ λ∗—
to be interpreted as the weight that a decent person ought to put on social welfare. The intuition
is that if max{g|g ∈ gi(si , s−i , d)} < λ∗ then other players resent player i’s choice. Given all
this, strategy profile s is a ‘reciprocal-fairness equilibrium’ (RFE) if there exists a profile d
and a correspondence gi(s, d) for all i such that, for all i, si is a best response to s−i given
d , and di = max[λ∗ − gi,0]—i.e., the demerit profile must be consistent with the profile of
strategies. This model presents several drawbacks like its complexity, the existence of many free
parameters, the lack of heterogeneity in players’ utility functions, and the fact that it is unclear
how to compute utilities if there are multiple equilibrium demerit profiles. In fact, Charness and
Rabin (2002, p. 851) do not see their model as “[. . . ] being primarily useful in its current form
for calibrating experimental data, but rather as providing progress in conceptualizing what we
observe in experiments.” In this respect, and because several of their intuitions are somehow
present in our model, one may see it as a tractable continuation of their research.
All above mentioned utility models are non-consequentialistic or non-separable (Camerer,
2003) because a player’s utility at terminal node z does not only depend on the distribution of
material payoffs at z. Other models are consequentialistic or separable. Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), for instance, model inequity aversion. Two key hypotheses
characterize Fehr and Schmidt (1999)—we use Eq. (1) to describe them. First, αAB(z) is a posi-
tive parameter if A gets a larger material payoff than B , that is, if xA(z) > xB(z). Second, αAB(z)
is a negative parameter if A gets a smaller material payoff than B—in other words, agents are
envious. In addition, players are heterogeneous regarding the inequity aversion parameters, and
for any individual, the envy parameter is larger than the parameter measuring advantageous in-
equity aversion. In turn, Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) posit that αAB(z) is positive (negative) if
A’s relative material payoff at z is above (below) the equitable relative payoff of 1/n, where n
is the number of players. Note well that this holds independently of how big B’s material payoff
is. Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) also assume that individuals are heterogeneous.
To finish, Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Charness and Rabin (2002) also offer consequen-
tialistic models to explain evidence coming from some experiments. Charness and Rabin (2002),
for example, hypothesize that αAB(z) is positive and, moreover, αAB(z) > αAC(z) for any other
player C if B happens to be the worst off agent. That is, players are altruists with Rawlsian
maximin concerns.5
The model
Material games and norms
Consider any extensive form game of perfect recall. Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of
players, and u(z) = {u1(z), . . . , un(z)} the vector of players’ payoffs at terminal node z. Players
are rational, that is, each one seeks to maximize her own payoff given her beliefs about other
players’ strategy.
In addition, let x(z) = {x1(z), . . . , xn(z)} denote the vector of material payoffs at z. In prin-
ciple xi(z) represents the cardinal utility that player i gets from consumption, money, and effort
exerted along the history of z. Nevertheless, in lab games—our main concern here—it seems
reasonable to simplify and assume that subjects’ material welfare just coincides with earned
money. Throughout the paper, hence, the terms ‘monetary payment’ and ‘material payoff’ are
synonyms. It is crucial to note that material payoffs and payoffs are not the same thing—i.e.,
generally xi(z) = ui(z) for any player i and node z. However, the researcher may initially have
information only about the material game, that is, the researcher may know xi(z) for any i and
z but not ui(z). We propose in what follows a theory on how to derive any ui(z) from the data
contained in the material game.
Definition 1. A norm Ψ is a nonempty correspondence Ψ :h → A(h) that applies on any in-
formation set h of any material game. Action a ∈ A(h) is said to be consistent with norm Ψ if
a ∈ Ψ (h). Otherwise, a is a deviation from Ψ .
One may interpret a norm as a prescription indicating how one ought to behave at any con-
ceivable situation at which one may be called to move. To put it like that, a norm orders the
available actions at any information set: Some are commendable and others are not. We provide
below an example of an specific norm: The Efficiency and Equity norm, or E-norm.
5 When mentioning Charness and Rabin (2002) in what follows, and unless otherwise noted, we refer to their model
of quasi-maximin preferences and not to the previously described reciprocity model.
Preferences
To simplify matters, assume that the E-norm is the only norm in the society and that there
exist two types of agents: Selfish and principled. Selfish people ignore the E-norm and just care
for their material payoff. Therefore, the utility of any such player at node z is given by
ui(z) = xi(z).
On the contrary, principled people have internalized the E-norm and suffer a cost when violat-
ing it, to be interpreted as a painful emotion. Furthermore, the intensity of the emotion depends
inversely on the number of transgressors. Thus, a principled deviator feels happier if every player
deviates than if she is the only deviator. One can interpret these assumptions as modeling the
effects of shame on preferences. In effect, in López-Pérez (2005) we provide psychological
evidence and argue that a deviation from an internalized norm triggers shame and that shame
intensity is strongly correlated with inferiority feelings—e.g., on how one’s actions compare
with others’.
To formalize this, let R(z) designate the set of players that respected the norm in the history
of z. Namely, R(z) includes all players who made choices consistent with the norm or no choice
at all in the history of z. Further, let r(z) denote the cardinality of set R(z). Given all this, a
principled player’s utility function takes the following form:
ui(z) =
{
xi(z) if i ∈ R(z),
xi(z) − γ · r(z) if i /∈ R(z); (γ > 0).
Parameter γ measures how intensely principled types have internalized the norm. The larger it
is, the more pain a principled deviator feels ceteris paribus. Importantly, γ is independent of the
particular deviation oneself made in the past. Although this is indeed an extreme simplification,
we show throughout the paper that it is enough to replicate many qualitative experimental results.
The E-norm
Let h denote an information set, A(h) denote its corresponding set of available actions, t0
denote an initial decision node, that is, any node immediately succeeding Nature’s moves—i.e.,
random shocks- and X(t0) denote the set of all x(z) that succeed decision node t0.
Definition 2. Allocation x = {x1, . . . , xn} ∈ X(t0) is an (ε, δ)—fairmax distribution of a material
game if it maximizes function
Fεδ = ε ·
∑
i∈N
xi − δ
(
max
i∈N xi − mini∈N xi
)
, (2)
over X(t0) for at least one node t0. A path connecting node t0 and one of its (ε, δ)-fairmax
distributions is an (ε, δ)-fairmax path of the material game.
Assuming ε, δ > 0, function Fεδ depends positively on the social efficiency of x—measured
as the sum of monetary payoffs—and negatively on the degree of inequality embodied in x. In
what follows, and given two real numbers a and b, Fab designates function Fεδ when ε = a, and
δ = b. Unless otherwise noted, we normalize the efficiency parameter ε to one and keep δ strictly
positive but smaller than one. Assumption 1 > δ indicates that social efficiency is relatively more
important than equality (we argue later why this assumption seems to be reasonable). To simplify
the exposition, we refer in what follows to a (1, δ)-fairmax distribution and a (1, δ)-fairmax path
as a ‘fairmax distribution’ and a ‘fairmax path,’ respectively.
To apply the E-norm to any material game, start by finding all its fairmax paths.6 Once this
task has been completed, the E-norm selects actions as follows:
(i) If information set h has at least one node on a fairmax path, the E-norm selects all actions
of A(h) that belong to a fairmax path.
(ii) Otherwise, the E-norm selects the whole set A(h).
It is worthy to mention the ideas that are buried in this norm. First, it is a norm of distributive
justice or fairness that sees fairness as positively depending on social efficiency and equality.
Second, this norm commends any player to play fairly—i.e., to follow a fairmax path—if others
played fairly as well. Of course, a player may be uncertain about previous play in some infor-
mation sets of some games. To put it like that, the norm commends in such a case to put one’s
faith on any previous mover, and play as if one believed that every previous mover played fairly
before. Finally, if the mover at h knows that at least one deviation has taken place then any action
becomes commendable. This latter feature is indeed extreme but it is enough to get our results
and simplifies the analysis. The model is flexible enough, however, to introduce other, more real-
istic norms. We discuss this point in a bit more of detail in the conclusion—see also López-Pérez
(2005) for descriptions of alternative, more sophisticated norms.
Players’ information. Equilibrium concept
We will often assume that each player’s type is private knowledge. That is, prior to the start
of any game Nature draws players independently from a population with a binomial distribution
over the set of types. Let μ denote the objective probability of being a principled agent. Following
standard usage, we assume throughout the main text that μ is common knowledge—i.e., priors
are common. In Appendix A, however, we explain one possible way to relax this assumption in
order to introduce some more heterogeneity, together with some applications of this idea.
Unless otherwise noted, we will use Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) as a solution con-
cept. A PBE consists of a probability assessment (beliefs) over the nodes of each player’s
information sets and a strategy profile. Assessments reflect what the player moving at the corre-
sponding information set believes has happened before reaching it. They must be, to the extent
possible, consistent with Bayesian updating on the hypothesis that the equilibrium strategies have
been used to date. In addition, any player’s strategy in a PBE must be sequentially rational. That
is, everybody must choose optimally at any of her information sets given her beliefs at that set
and the fact that future play will be governed by the equilibrium strategies. To finish, it is im-
portant to clarify that in our model assessments do not play any practical role at information sets
out of a fairmax path. That is, once a “bad” action has taken place and that becomes common
knowledge, beliefs about the type of the opponent are unimportant to explain behavior. Because
6 Infinite material games may have no fairmax distribution. Suppose, for example, that t0 is such that X(t0) consists of
all vectors (x1, x2) such that x1 + x2 = 1, except x = (1/2,1/2). It is trivial then that no distribution maximizes function
F1δ over X(t) when δ = 0. All the material games we consider in the applications have at least one fairmax distribution.
For completeness, however, one may assume that the E-norm allows any move at any h of a material game with no
fairmax distribution. For an alternative, consult López-Pérez (2005).
of this, we will not mention such beliefs when describing a PBE. This simplifies considerably
the analysis.
Explaining experimental evidence (I)
In this section we use the model to explain experimental evidence coming from a number of
games. In addition, we will provide some tentative answers to three questions: (1) How well does
the E-norm approximate the actual moral standards that some subjects take to the lab? (2) What
are the factors that explain norm compliance in one-shot games if deviations cannot be punished?
and (3) Do people treat equally well passive players and active and compliant ones?
On individual decision problems: Efficiency and equality matter
Why have we assumed that the E-norm is the only norm in the society? One reason is indeed
parsimony: We could assume that principled types are heterogeneous and care about different
norms, but this would complicate the model. A second reason is that the available empirical
evidence seems to fit rather well with the idea that social efficiency and equality are important
ingredients of subjects’ views on distributive justice, and that social efficiency is relatively more
important than equality.
To justify this last statement, it is convenient to consider the simplest possible scenario: An
individual decision problem with externalities. In general terms, our model predicts that selfish
agents choose the allocation that maximizes their own monetary earnings whereas principled
agents choose the same allocation that selfish ones if their parameter γ is sufficiently low and
the fairmax distribution that gives them a highest monetary payoff otherwise.
An example will help to understand these predictions. In the so-called Dictator game, one
subject (the ‘dictator’) is endowed with a sum of money M and must decide how much of that
money to transfer to another subject (the ‘dummy’). Obviously, selfish dictators give nothing.
What about principled ones? As the unique fairmax distribution is equal sharing, a principled
dictator will get a utility payoff of M2 if she gives half of the money to the other subject, and a
utility payoff of M −x−γ if she transfers x = M2 (to understand why she suffers a psychological
cost γ , note that the dummy belongs to set R(z) for any z because she makes no choice in the
game). This latter expression takes a maximum value of M −γ when x = 0, and hence it follows
that a principled dictator respects the E-norm if the psychological cost γ is larger than M2 , gives
nothing if γ is smaller than M2 , and is indifferent between both options if γ equals
M
2 . To sum
up, principled dictators follow their principles if that is not too costly.7
Experimental results on the Dictator game—see Camerer (2003, pp. 57–58), for an extensive
survey—are somewhat sensitive to the degree of anonymity enjoyed by subjects when choosing,
and the wording of instructions. Nonetheless, one may reasonably contend that
(i) the average offer is around 0.25M ,
(ii) an average of 35–40% of the participants give nothing, and
(iii) there are virtually no offers above 50% of the stake.
7 Hence, marginal changes in parameter γ may produce radical switches in principled agents’ behavior. This feature
disappears if we assume that the intensity of the internal punishment conveniently depends on the particular deviation a
principled agent does. We have investigated this issue in López-Pérez (2005).
Result (iii) is clearly replicated by our model, whereas results (i) and (ii) are consistent if we
assume that μ and γ take appropriate values.8
Our predictions depend heavily on the values of the efficiency parameter ε and the inequality
parameter δ of function (2). To illustrate this, assume for a moment ε = 1 and δ = 0. Since any
monetary allocation in the dictator game is (1,0)-fairmax, the model would then forecast that
any type of player gives zero money. Dictator game results, therefore, reject a model based on
the idea that all principled players believe that distributive justice exclusively depends on social
efficiency. If, on the contrary, one assumes ε = 0 and δ = 1 (that is, equality is the only ingredient
of justice), equal sharing is the only (0,1)-fairmax distribution and predictions coincide with
those when ε = 1 and 0 < δ < 1.
Therefore, the standard dictator game does not discriminate between a formulation based on
function F01 and the one we use throughout the paper, based on F1δ for 0 < δ < 1. In contrast,
the ingenious design of Andreoni and Miller (2002) allows for that. In their dictator game exper-
iments, transfers of money were multiplied by a factor that differed from session to session and
was common knowledge. In one session, for instance, the factor was equal to 3 so that a transfer
of x units of the dictator’s initial endowment translated in final earnings of 3x for the dummy.
In this session and also when the factor was equal to 2, a significant number of dictators made
transfers such that they ended up with less money than the receiver. This is consistent with our
specification based on F1δ for 0 < δ < 1 but not with one based on F01. Thus, agents seem to be
concerned with both social efficiency and equality, assigning a larger weight to the first variable.
More experimental data supports this conjecture. In Study 2, Decision 1 of Charness and
Grosskopf (2001), subjects had to choose between (self, other) allocations of pesetas (625, 625)
and (600, 1200).9 Trivially, selfish agents choose allocation (625, 625) whereas principled ones
choose the efficient allocation (600, 1200) if γ and δ are high and small enough, respectively,
and the egalitarian one otherwise. Charness and Grosskopf (2001) report that only 33.3% of the
subjects (N = 108) chose the egalitarian allocation. Additionally, in their Study 2, Decision 3,
the same subjects received 600 pesetas and had to choose any payoff for another participant be-
tween 300 and 1200 pesetas. 74.1% of the subjects chose 1200 pesetas—i.e., the only fairmax
distribution. Only 10.2% of them chose opponent’s earnings equal to 600 pesetas—i.e., the egal-
itarian distribution. To sum up: If one assumes that principled types exclusively care about one
norm, a model based on our E-norm is more coherent with the data that one based on a norm of
social efficiency (F10), a norm of equality (F01), or on a norm of social efficiency and equality
in which equality receives a larger weight than efficiency (that is, F1δ for 1 < δ). It is important
to stress, however, that there exist other norms that we have not considered here and that might
generate better predictions. Suppose, for instance, that we had defined a fairmax distribution as
an allocation maximizing function
Q(x) =
∑
i∈N
xi + τ min
i∈N {xi}, (3)
where 0 < τ . Closest to Charness and Rabin’s theoretical approach, this function combines social
efficiency and maximin. Would such a model explain better the data? Note first that in two-player
games this formulation predicts similar results to one based on our E-norm. Therefore, we need
8 However, our model fails to provide an accurate picture of the actual distribution of offers, which are usually scattered
along the interval [0,M/2] and not concentrated on the extremes. See the previous footnote to this respect.
9 At the exchange rate of the moment, one US dollar was around 150 pesetas. Each participant took decisions in three
different problems but was paid for only one of those problems, chosen at random at the end of the session.
multiple-player games to discriminate between both formulations. For instance, consider four
players A, B , C, D and assume that A is the only active player, that she is principled, and that
she must choose between (A, B , C, D) dollar allocations (100, 131, 130, 49) and (100, 200,
50, 50). Both allocations are equally efficient, but the first one is more egalitarian (at least ac-
cording to function F1δ), while the second one maximizes the payment of the worst-off player.
As a result, A would choose the former allocation if she had internalized our E-norm, and the lat-
ter one if she cared about a norm based on the above mentioned function Q(x) (note that she gets
100 dollars whatever her choice so that her value of γ is immaterial here). Unfortunately, and
as far as we are concerned, there is no empirical data on dictator games like this one that would
allow us to discriminate between these two approaches.10 Hence, this is still an open question
that requires more attention from experimental economists.
We finish by comparing our predictions with those from other models. For instance, Fehr
and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) assume no
efficiency concerns and a more or less complex form of inequity aversion. It should be hence clear
that they are inconsistent with the evidence cited previously. The same occurs with Levine (1998),
at least if we take the distribution of types that Levine posits. Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2004) are also inconsistent with the above mentioned data because they predict
that no agent sacrifices her own material payoff to reward a dummy player—this is true at least
for the simplest version of Rabin (1993). On the contrary, Charness and Rabin (2002) is largely
consistent.
Charness and Rabin (2002) also report abundant experimental evidence that contradicts a util-
ity model based exclusively on (linear) inequity aversion and material interest. In game Berk23
of Charness and Rabin (2002), for instance, subjects choose between (self, other) allocations of
US dollars (2, 8) and (0, 0). Our model predicts that all agents choose the first allocation and
this is exactly the actual result. In contrast, Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000) predict that a significant proportion of subjects choose (0, 0). Note further that Levine
(1998), which assumes that some players are malevolent, shares this prediction.
As another illustration, participants in game Barc2 of Charness and Rabin (2002) chose be-
tween (self, other) allocations of pesetas (400, 400) and (375, 750). Principled players choose
the second allocation if γ is high enough whereas selfish agents choose the first allocation. On
the opposite, inequity aversion models predict that all agents choose the first allocation. It turned
out that 50% of the participants chose the first allocation. In the same line, Charness and Rabin
(2002) show that 69% of the participants choose (self, other) allocations of dollars of (4, 7.5)
over (4, 4).
Norm compliance without punishment threats
People respect norms in nonrepeated interactions even if transgressions cannot be punished
and compliance is contrary to material interest. This section explores what factors affect norm
compliance in such settings. Intuitively, a principled player will obey the E-norm—and, by ex-
tension, any other norm—if two conditions hold. First, she must have internalized the E-norm
with enough intensity. In effect, principled agents suffer a psychological cost if they deviate
from the E-norm. Nevertheless, if the expected material benefit of deviating is sufficiently high
to overcome the expected pang—which depends, among other factors, on parameter γ —she
10 For instance, Engelmann and Strobel (2004) study dictator games with multiple dummies, but choices are not
efficiency-preserving in any of their games.
may succumb to the temptation and deviate. Consequently norm compliance requires sufficiently
strong convictions. Second, she must believe that sufficiently many other players will comply as
well. This follows from the fact that the psychological cost of deviating depends directly on the
number of norm followers, and means that norm compliance follows a reciprocal logic. Let us
also remark that a player’s expectations that the others will comply subtly depend on her expec-
tations about the other players’ types. Believing that player B is selfish suffices to infer that B
will indeed deviate. On the contrary, believing that B is principled is not enough to sustain the
belief that B will comply. We will come back to this point later.
To illustrate all these points, consider a two-player material game in which players 1 and 2
must choose simultaneously positive numbers q1 and q2, respectively. As a result, player i gets
a monetary reward xi = Kqi − qiqj − q2i , where K is a positive number and i, j ∈ {1,2}, i = j .
This is a Cournot duopoly game in which firms’ marginal costs take a common, constant value c
and demand is linear, that is, p = M − Q, where M is a constant (M > c), p denotes the price,
and Q the sum of quantities produced by each firm. In this setting, K = M − c.
Standard optimization techniques show that the sum of monetary rewards is maximized when
q1 + q2 = K2 . Moreover, each player gets the same material payoff if q1 = q2. Therefore the
unique fairmax distribution of this game is implemented when both players choose qF = K4 ,
and that is what the E-norm commends. When do players respect the E-norm? A first point to
make in this respect is that no player will do that if she does not expect the opponent to comply
as well. Basically, this occurs because producing qF is never in the firms’ material interest—a
standard textbook result shows that if the firm is selfish then qF is a strictly dominated strategy.
Consequently, selfish firms will never produce qF , and principled ones will choose qF only if
they expect the opponent to produce qF as well.11
Proposition 1. A strategy profile in which both selfish and principled players choose qNC = K3
is a PBE for any prior μ. This is the only PBE strategy profile in which both types deviate from
qF = K4 .
Proof. Selfish agents always seek to maximize material reward xi = Kqi −qiqj −q2i . The same
is true for principled agents if the opponent deviates from the norm (qj = K4 ). Fixing qj , one
may show by standard optimization techniques that maximization of xi requires qi = K−qj2 . Now,
given the symmetry of the problem, both players should make the same choice at equilibrium.
Hence, we have q1 = q2 = K3 . 
Production level qNC corresponds to the textbook Nash–Cournot prediction when both firms
are self-interested. Further, note that this equilibrium exists for any μ and, in particular, for μ = 1,
that is, in a complete information game played by two principled agents. Intuitively, and since
principled types follow norms reciprocally, mutual distrust—i.e., the mutual expectation that the
opponent will not comply—destroys any respect for the norm. Assuming then that principled
types trust each other, does an equilibrium exist?
Proposition 2. A strategy profile in which principled players choose qF = K4 and selfish ones
qC = θqF , where θ = 4−μ3−μ , is a PBE strategy profile if 4(3 − μ)
√
μγ K .
11 Note incidentally that the Cournot material game is an instance of a social dilemma: Mutual cooperation is collec-
tively optimal, but defection is individually optimal (in material terms).
Proof. We show first that selfish agents play a best-response. Expected utility of playing qi is
given by
μ
(
Kqi − qiqF − q2i
)+ (1 − μ)(Kqi − qiqC − q2i ) (4)
or alternatively by qiπ − q2i , where π = K − μqF − (1 − μ)qC . Differentiating qiπ − q2i with
respect to qi and equating that to zero, we get as a necessary (and sufficient) condition for maxi-
mum that qi = π2 , and some algebra shows that π2 = qC .
To prove that principled agents play a best response as well, we first compute their expected
utility of playing qF . For that, and since they follow the norm and feel no remorse, it suffices to
substitute qF for qi at expression (4) so that their expected payoff equals πqF −q2F = q2F (2θ −1).
Suppose now that a principled agent deviates from qF . Her expected utility is then qiπ −q2i −μγ
and the best she can do is producing qi = π2 , hence getting an expected payoff of π
2
4 − μγ =
θ2q2F − μγ . It follows that playing qF is optimal if
q2F (2θ − 1) θ2q2F − μγ. (5)
And some algebra proves inequality (5) to be equivalent to 4(3 − μ)√μγ K . 
Note that this equilibrium exists only if parameters γ and μ are large enough. Experimen-
tal evidence on the Cournot game is summarized in Holt (1995). Although results are far from
conclusive, they show that a significant number of participants in one-shot games attempt tac-
itly to collude, choosing output levels close to the joint-income maximizing level qF , whereas
remaining subjects make quantity choices around the Nash–Cournot equilibrium. Interestingly,
if repetition (with rematching) is allowed, cooperation tend to vanish with time and most output
decisions shift back to the Cournot level. However, the rate of convergence is not equal for all
pairs of subjects: Some of them converge very fast while others mutually cooperate for a signif-
icant number of rounds. We briefly argue in the appendix that this might be explained by belief
heterogeneity and learning about the opponent’s type.
Positive reciprocity: active and passive players
Most modern models of reciprocity—Rabin (1993), Levine (1998), Dufwenberg and Kirch-
steiger (2004), and Falk and Fischbacher (2006)—predict a phenomenon called positive reci-
procity. That is, people are in average more generous and kind toward those who exhibited kind
behavior in the past than toward passive players that did not perform any action—the reciprocity
model of Charness and Rabin (2002) is an exception because if a player does not misbehave
then her demerit is zero, as a dummy player’s. The E-norm, on the contrary, only allows “un-
kind behavior” if it is certain that the opponent deviated before. This implies that dummy players
are as equally legitimated to receive a kind treatment as active norm compliers—i.e., our model
predicts no positive reciprocity.
To illustrate the differences between our model and other reciprocity models, consider the
Mini-Trust Material game represented at Fig. 1. The first mover (the ‘investor’) chooses either
not to trust (move D) or to trust (move T ) the second player (the ‘trustee’). In the first case,
the investor gets x monetary units and the trustee gets 0 units. Alternatively, the investor may
trust and give the trustee the chance to repay trust (move R) or not (move A). If trust is repaid,
both earn r (> x) monetary units. If trust is not repaid, the investor gets the ‘sucker’ payoff s
(< x) and the trustee earns the highest payment t . To sum up, we have s < x < r < t . In most
Fig. 1. Mini-Trust Material game.
experiments, values are chosen so that (r, r) is the unique fairmax distribution for any δ < 1. We
assume that in what follows.
Consider now two variations of this mini-trust game. In the intentions treatment player 1 is
active and she effectively chooses her move whereas in the random treatment player 1 is passive
and her move is decided by Nature—e.g., with the flip of a coin. Note that the unique fairmax
path of the random treatment simply consists of action R—recall that a fairmax path always
starts after all random moves have been made—whereas the only fairmax path of the intentions
treatment is formed by moves T and R. Suppose then that player 2 is asked to move, will he
behave differently in each treatment? The answer is negative.
Proposition 3. In equilibrium and independently of the treatment, selfish trustees choose A
whereas principled ones choose R if γ is high enough and A otherwise.
Proof. Selfish movers go for the highest material payoff so that they play A. Since the E-norm
commends trustees to move R in both treatments, principled trustees comply if the utility of
playing R is larger than that of playing A, that is, r > t − γ . 
Let us compare with other models. Consequentialistic models as Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Charness and Rabin (2002) predict no behavioral difference
between both treatments. On the contrary and as we stated above, most models of reciprocity
predict a significant decay in repay in the random treatment. Levine (1998), for instance, predicts
some decay because trusting in the intentions treatment signals benevolence, which is rewarded,
whereas the random treatment does not allow this kind of type-selection.
Most of the evidence in this regard is consistent with our model. Dufwenberg and Gneezy
(2000) report data from an experimental Lost Wallet game which is very similar to our mini-
trust game—the main differences are that player 2 faces a continuum of choices (more precisely,
he plays a dictator game with stake size 2r) if player 1 trusts him, and that x is larger than r
in some treatments (however, x < 2r), but these differences are inconsequential for our model.
They compare second movers’ choices with data from a pure dictator game with stake size 2r
and do not reject the hypothesis that both sets of data come from the same distribution. Since
a pure dictator game can be seen as a particular case of our random treatment, this is plainly
consistent with Proposition 3.
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) also show that second movers’ payback is uncorrelated with
player 1’s outside option x, and this is again consistent with our model but not with other
reciprocity models—except that of Charness and Rabin (2002). Charness and Rabin (2002),
Offerman (2002), and Cox and Deck (2005) report similar results. In contrast, a number of exper-
imental papers have reported opposite results—consult Camerer (2003, pp. 89–90) for a useful
discussion and references. Overall, the evidence suggests that people care sometimes about oth-
ers’ intentions, but also that this concern is fragile. More experimental research is due in this
regard.
Games with multiple moves: the Centipede Material game
This is a two-person material game that resembles the homonym game introduced by Rosen-
thal (1982). For expositional purposes, assume that player 1 (2) is female (male). Each player
alternately gets a turn to either terminate the game or pass the turn to the opponent. In the
original version, this process may last a maximum of one hundred moves (hence the name “cen-
tipede”). In the last node, player 2 chooses between a socially efficient monetary vector (x1, x2)
and an inefficient one (x∗1 , x∗2 ) in which, however, he gets a larger monetary payment, that is,
x1 + x2 > x∗1 + x∗2 but x∗2 > x2. In turn, if player 1 terminates the game at the penultimate node,
distribution (x′1, x′2) is reached such that x∗1 + x∗2 > x′1 + x′2 but x′1 > x∗1 . An analogous pattern
repeats in all the previous nodes.
If it is common knowledge that both players are selfish and rational, there exists a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium. In it, any player terminates at any node and, consequently, the least
efficient outcome is reached. One can show this by backward induction. In effect, a selfish sec-
ond player would choose the inefficient but own-payoff maximizing allocation at the last node.
In turn, the first player would terminate the game in the previous node in order to get a higher
payoff. Analogously, any player would choose, if given the choice, to terminate the game at any
node.
Nonetheless, experiments with a simpler version of the centipede game show that this gloomy
prediction is far from correct. McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) report experimental results from
four-move and six-move Centipede material games—Fig. 2 reproduces the decision tree and
monetary payments of the four-move game. Most subjects choose to pass the turn in the initial
nodes. Furthermore, a nonnegligible proportion of the participants pass at every decision node—
including the last one—if given the opportunity, thus providing clear evidence that some subjects
are not purely selfish. Finally, the proportion of movers who terminate the game at each node
increases as the last node gets closer. Note that these results are also inconsistent with models
of inequity averse preferences like Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)
which predict, at this specific centipede game, that all players terminate at the first node.
Fig. 2. Four-move Centipede Material game.
We prove in what follows that if some subjects have internalized the E-norm, then the model
can replicate the previous experimental facts and, moreover, we highlight that players’ degree of
internalization of the norm—measured by parameter γ —and the priors μ are the key variables
that explain individual behavior. To start, notice that there is only one strategy profile which is
consistent with the E-norm: All players should pass the turn at every node.
Some required notation follows. We denote the initial node as node 1, the next node as node 2
and so on. The action of passing (terminating) at node k is denoted as Pk (Tk). Finally, let μ(k)
denote the beliefs that the player moving at node k has about the opponent’s type—obviously,
μ(1) = μ. We study two cases: 0.8 < γ < 1.6, and 1.6 < γ in order to show how differing levels
of internalization affect behavior. The results can be extended to other values of γ .
Proposition 4. Assume 0.8 < γ < 1.6. If μ > 1/7 there is only one PBE strategy profile. In it,
player 2 plays (P2, T4) independently of his type, and player 1 plays (P1,P3) if she is principled
and (P1, T3) if she is selfish. If μ < 1/7 there is also a unique PBE strategy profile. Princi-
pled players play the same strategy as before. A selfish second mover plays T4 and randomizes
between T2 and P2, assigning probability 1−7μ7[1−μ] to T2, and selfish first player chooses T3 and
randomizes between T1 and P1, assigning probability 6μ1−μ to P1. In the marginal case in which
μ = 1/7, there exists multiple PBE.
Proof. Since γ < 1.6, principled players pass at every node except the last one independently
of their beliefs. Trivially, a selfish second player also moves T4 and, consequently, a selfish first
mover chooses T3. All this implies that a selfish second player moves T2 if
0.8 > 3.2μ(2) + [1 − μ(2)](0.4) ⇔ μ(2) < 1
7
,
he moves P2 if μ(2) > 17 , and he is indifferent between T2 and P2 if μ(2) = 17 . Moving backward
to the first node, we must consider three cases depending on the value of μ(2). First, if μ(2) > 17
then a selfish first mover moves P1 because any type of second mover plays P2 subsequently.
Since principled types also play P1, Bayes’ law implies μ(2) = μ so that consistency of beliefs
requires μ > 17 . Second, if μ(2) <
1
7 then a selfish second player moves T2. Consequently, a
selfish first mover plays T1 if 0.4 > 1.6μ + [1 − μ](0.2) ⇔ μ < 17 , she plays P1 if μ > 17 , and
she is indifferent between both actions if μ = 17 . None of them can happen in equilibrium if
μ(2) < 17 . In effect, suppose first μ <
1
7 . Then a selfish first mover plays T1 so that Bayes’
law entails μ(2) = 1, hence contradicting our hypothesis that μ(2) < 17 . An analogous line of
reasoning applies to remaining cases. Third, assume μ(2) = 17 so that a selfish second mover is
indifferent between P2 and T2, and let ρ(2) denote the probability that he chooses P2. A selfish
first player chooses P1 if
0.4 < 1.6μ + [1 − μ](1.6ρ(2) + [1 − ρ(2)]0.2) ⇔ ρ(2) > 1 − 7μ
7[1 − μ] .
In that case, Bayes’ law requires μ(2) = μ = 17 and any strictly positive value of ρ(2) is then
optimal. In turn, a selfish first mover would choose T1 if ρ(2) < 1−7μ7[1−μ] , and Bayes’ law would
then imply μ(2) = 1, contradicting our assumption. Finally, if ρ(2) = 1−7μ then a selfish first7[1−μ]
mover is indifferent between T1 and P1—let ρ(1) denote the probability that a selfish player 1
chooses P1. Bayes’ law implies
μ(2) = μ
μ + (1 − μ)ρ(1) ,
which gives ρ(1) = 6μ1−μ in equilibrium since μ(2) = 17 by assumption. Further, note that consis-
tency of beliefs requires μ < 17 , thus concluding the proof. 
The intuition why principled people pass in all nodes node but the last one should be clear.
Since the amount of money at play in the first three nodes is so small compared with parameter γ ,
they pass the turn—i.e., respect the norm—to prevent feeling badly for being the deviator. In the
last node, on the contrary, the material temptation to deviate is large enough to compensate the
psychological cost they suffer as a result.
All this has an interesting implication: If the game grows in length, it requires stronger inter-
nalization of the norm—i.e., larger γ —to make principled agents pass the turn at the final nodes.
In other words, if the size of the ‘cake’ grows very much then principled people need to be ‘very
principled’ not to deviate at the final nodes. In fact, experimental evidence seems to show that
people are not so strongly ‘principled’. McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) compare behavior in a
four- and six-move centipede game—the latter one obtains from the former (Fig. 2) by adding
two additional nodes so that T5, T6, and P6 lead to pecuniary allocations (6.4, 1.6), (3.2, 12.8),
and (25.6, 6.4), respectively. According to their results, “If we compare the four-move games to
the last four moves of the six-move games, there is more taking in the six-move games.”12
Our model predicts the same phenomenon if, instead of adding additional turns, one simply
multiplies all monetary payments by a common factor larger than one. For example, take the
game in Fig. 2 and multiply all its payments by 4. Parameter γ should be then larger than 6.4 for
a principled type to pass at the last node. In comparison, γ only needs to be larger than 1.6 for
that to happen in the game Fig. 2. Of course, something similar is true for every node, not only
the last one. Therefore, the probability of terminating at any node is theoretically equal or larger
for the transformed game than for the game in Fig. 2. The experimental results that McKelvey
and Palfrey (1992) offer are on this line, although the difference is not completely significative.
The reason why selfish agents pass the turn in the initial nodes follows from a reputational
argument à la Kreps et al. (1982). As they know that principled players are willing to pass, they
mimic such behavior in order to induce in a potential selfish opponent the belief that they are also
principled people. In such a way, they succeed in making a selfish opponent pass and, hence, earn
more money. Consistent with experimental data, the probability that a selfish agent abandons her
mimicking strategy and terminates increases as she approaches the last node.
Proposition 5. Assume 1.6 < γ . In any PBE, a principled player passes at every node. If μ > 17
then a selfish second mover plays (P2, T4) whereas a selfish 1 plays (P1,P3). If 149 < μ < 17 ,
then a selfish second player moves T4 and randomizes between T2 and P2, assigning probability
1−7μ
1−μ to T2. She plays P1 and randomizes between T3 and P3, assigning probability
6
7(1−μ)
12 McKelvey and Palfrey (1992, p. 810). They propose an incomplete information model in which some players are
altruists that pass at every node whereas the remaining agents are selfish ones. Their model has similar predictions to
ours, although it cannot explain why the probability of terminating at the last node is lower in the six-move game than in
the four-move game.
to T3. If μ < 149 , a selfish first player assigns some probability to T1. Apart of that, the PBE
strategy profile is identical to that when 149 < μ < 17 . In the marginal cases in which μ = 149 , and
μ = 1/7, there exists multiple PBE.
Proof. The proof of this proposition is very similar to that of Proposition 4. It is left to the
reader. 
The previous proposition shows how the intensity of internalization, measured by parame-
ter γ , affects behavior of both principled and selfish players. Another factor that obviously runs
the results is the particular norm we posited. If one assumed a pure norm of equality (F01), for
instance, predictions would then coincide with the standard equilibrium. To understand why, ob-
serve that such norm recommends any player to terminate the game at any node. As a result,
material interest would lead to the standard prediction. The fact that subjects do not behave like
that suggests that they understand justice or fairness as something more than pure egalitarianism.
5. Extending the model: anger and punishment
We assume that only principled agents—i.e., those who have internalized the E-norm—
display anger. This hypothesis is somewhat speculative, although there is some supporting
evidence coming from Burnham (2007). In this experiment, subjects played a constrained ul-
timatum game where the only two offers were either $5 or $25 out of $40. Moreover, subjects’
testosterone levels were measured using saliva samples. Now, it is well known that high levels
of testosterone are correlated with aggressive behavior. Therefore it is not surprising that sub-
jects with high testosterone levels were relatively more likely to reject the $5 offer. But Burnham
(2007) shows something more: Subjects with high levels of testosterone were also relatively more
likely to make an offer of $25. This kind of correlations are consistent with our model.
Hence, one only needs to introduce some changes in principled agents’ utility function, which
is now given by
Ui(z) =
⎧⎨
⎩
xi(z) if R(z) ≡ N,
xi(z) − γ · r(z) if i /∈ R(z); (γ > 0),
xi(z) − α maxj /∈R(z) xj (z) if R(z) ⊂ N, i ∈ R(z); (1 α > 0).
Since anger goes associated with a desire to punish the deviator, we model it as history-
dependent spite. Clearly, parameter α measures aggressiveness. Further, and for simplicity, anger
intensity does not depend on the particular deviation that the deviator made, and angry agents
focus at the best off deviator. These assumptions are probably a bit unrealistic, but that does not
prevent the model from explaining much qualitative evidence—we will briefly discuss later how
to extend the model. We maintain the remaining assumptions of the model that were introduced
in the previous chapter.13
13 One may wonder whether previous results, obtained without the anger assumption, still hold. With a small caveat,
the answer is positive for two reasons. First, if a deviation from the E-norm occurs in any of the games we studied then
the action that maximizes the material payoff of the nondeviator also minimizes the deviator’s material payoff. Hence, an
angry player would make the same choices as a selfish one—note that this is no longer true for the games that we study
in what follows. Second, if no deviation has taken place there is no place for anger, except as an expected emotion. Now,
if someone expects the opponent to deviate then she will be less willing to respect the norm, because she expects to be
angry, which is painful. To respect the norm, therefore, principled people require a larger parameter γ or a larger prior
μ. Except for this quantitative differences, previous results still hold.
Fig. 3. Mini-Ultimatum Material game.
Determinants of punishment: the Ultimatum game
In this sequential material game player 1 (the ‘proposer’) is provisionally allocated M > 0
monetary units and has to propose how to divide that money between her and player 2 (the
‘responder’). Given any proposal of sharing (x1,M − x1), the responder can either accept or
reject. If he accepts, he gets M − x1 and the proposer gets x1. If he rejects, both get nothing.
Having a continuum of offers does not change our predictions. Thus, we have represented
at Fig. 3 a reduced version of the ultimatum material game in which player 1 has only two
choices available: ‘Unfair’ (u) and ‘fair’ (f ). The former choice consists of an offer of (1−ρ)M
monetary units to player 2, where ρ is a number in the interval [0,1]. In turn, choice f consists
of a proposal of equal sharing and it is thus consistent with the E-norm. Player 2 can either ac-
cept (A) or reject (R)—note that the E-norm allows player 2 to choose both A and R if player 1
offered u (because u constitutes a deviation from the norm) whereas the E-norm only selects A
if player 1 chose f .
Proposition 6. For any priors μ and almost any ρ, the mini-ultimatum game has a unique PBE
strategy profile. A principled responder always accepts the equal sharing whereas she accepts
a demand of ρM if ρ < 11+α and rejects if ρ > 11+α . A selfish responder accepts any offer if
ρ > 0. A principled proposer’s choice depends on the values of γ and ρ:
ρ <
1
2
then she offers the equal sharing.
1
2
< ρ <
1
1 + α then she offers u if γ <
M(2ρ − 1)
2
and f otherwise.
1
1 + α < ρ then she offers u if γ <
M[(1 − μ)2ρ − 1]
2
and f otherwise.
Finally, a selfish proposer offers u if ρ and μ are large and small enough, respectively, and
the equal sharing otherwise.
Proof. Accepting offer f is consistent with the E-norm and beneficial in monetary terms. There-
fore, any type of responder accepts that offer. Offering u makes a principled responder angry so
that she accepts u only if
(1 − ρ)M − αρM > 0.
Trivially, a selfish responder accepts u for any ρ > 0.
Consider now a selfish proposer. She offers f if ρ  12 because f is always accepted and gives
more money in that case. For analogous reasons, she offers u if 11+α > ρ >
1
2 . Further, offer u
is not accepted by a principled responder if ρ > 11+α so that a selfish proposer will make that
offer only if (1 − μ)ρM > 0.5M , that is, if 2ρ−12ρ > μ. To finish, consider a principled proposer.
The 50–50 offer is clearly optimal if ρ  12 . Finally, offering u gives ρM − γ units of utility
if 11+α > ρ >
1
2 and (1 − μ)ρM − γ units of expected utility if ρ > 11+α . Simple algebraic
manipulations prove that a principled proposer’s strategy is optimal.14 
The mini-ultimatum game, in its simplicity, shows many of the implications of our model
regarding punishment. First, principled people punish—i.e., reject an offer—because they feel
angry at violators of the E-norm. Second, angry responders trade off their desire for revenge and
their material interest. Note that rejecting an offer costs (1−ρ)M , that is, the amount of the offer.
As ρ decreases, the cost of punishment increases, and that explains why principled responders
do not reject very large unfair offers. The threshold depends crucially on the aggressiveness
parameter α.
The previous ideas are consistent with the empirical evidence. Table 1 shows data reported
in Slonim and Roth (1998) from one ultimatum game in which the stake size was 1500 Slovak
Crowns (Sk), valued almost 48.5$ at the exchange rate of that moment. For instance, 32.4% of
all offers were in the offer range [40–45)—i.e., each of them was larger or equal than 40% of
the stake and smaller than 45% of the stake—and 4.9% of these offers were rejected. Consistent
with our prediction, low offers are frequently rejected, and the probability of rejection tends to
decrease as the offer increases. This result has been replicated in many other ultimatum game
experiments.15
With respect to the proposer’s behavior, our model predicts that she will never offer more than
half of the cake, which is basically consistent with experimental evidence. Moreover, the precise
Table 1
Summary of Slonim and Roth (1998). Percentages of offers and rejec-
tions by range of offers
Offer ranges % Offers % Rejections
>50% 7.2 0
=50% 30.8 1.3
[45–50)% 6 0
[40–45)% 32.4 4.9
[35–40)% 5.2 0
[30–35)% 7.2 11.1
[25–30)% 3.2 37.5
<25% 8 60
14 This proposition holds for almost any ρ. More than one equilibrium exists if ρ = 11+α (ρ = 0) because principled
(selfish) responders are then indifferent between accepting or rejecting the unfair offer. The interested reader may easily
find those equilibria.
15 See Camerer (2003) or Güth (1995) for evidence on this. Note that one could easily introduce more heterogeneity
regarding anger parameter α. If conveniently modeled, this idea could indeed explain why offers are scattered.
offer a proposer makes depends on her type, parameters α and γ , the size of the cake M , and
priors μ. Let us consider each one separately.
To start, the proposer’s type and parameter γ largely influence her degree of norm compli-
ance. To make this point clear, assume for a moment that principled players may differ on the
degree of internalization of the E-norm so that each one is characterized by a particular γi . In
that case, principled proposers with a sufficiently large γi would choose equal sharing—note
that Proposition 6 still applies in this case. On the other hand, selfish and weak-willed princi-
pled proposers—i.e., those with a small γi—would tend to choose meaner offers, if available.
Note, nevertheless, if the amount of money M at play is large enough, even a large parameter γi
might not be enough to offset the material benefits of deviating from the fair sharing. In other
words, the larger the size of the stake, the meaner (in percentage) the average offer. In this regard
the experimental evidence shows that changes in stakes have some (although small) effect on
proposals.16
Parameter α is important because it determines principled responders’ acceptance threshold—
the larger α is, the larger such threshold is. Well informed proposers who pretend to deviate from
the E-norm should take this into account and, consequently, adjust their offers to their beliefs
about α and μ. In fact, it is a robust experimental fact that there are almost no offers below 0.2M .
This seems to indicate that deviant proposers expect a high proportion of aggressive responders.
We finish by noting that our model predicts a positive correlation between the offers that a
same agent would make in the dictator and the ultimatum games, specially if the stake is not
big. Although we are not aware of any within-subjects experiment testing this, we can at least
compare ultimatum and dictator game data coming from between-subjects designs. The two most
important results are that offers are less concentrated in the dictator game than in the ultimatum
game, and that average offer is smaller in the dictator game. Our model is consistent with those
facts and explains them because of the impossibility to punish deviators in the dictator game.
Path-dependency and punishment: the choice set matters
A principled player’s utility function is path-dependent because its functional form depends
on previous history. Hence, our model differs radically from consequentialistic models in which
utility only depends on the material outcome of an interaction: One’s feelings in two different
games may differ even if the material outcome coincides. Path-dependency is crucial to under-
stand violence and conflict. One crucial idea in this respect is that the choice set matters: An
action with equal material consequences may be perfectly right in one setting but not in another
in which, due to a larger choice set, the norms at work commend different behavior. To illustrate
this, imagine one firm and a trade union setting wages: A wage increase that is fair during a re-
cession may be completely insulting during a period of expansion—see Kahneman et al. (1986)
for evidence on this. As a result, workers’ reactions in each case—e.g., the probability of going
to strike—may differ.
As another illustration, consider the mini-ultimatum material games represented at Fig. 4 (a)
and (b). Player 1 can either offer ‘left’ (l) or ‘right’ (r) and player 2 can accept (A) or reject
(R) any offer. In both games, ‘left’ consists of an offer to give eight and two monetary units to
player 1 and 2, respectively. In game (5/5), ‘right’ is an offer to share equally ten monetary units
while in game (10/0) ‘right’ consists of a demand of the whole cake for player 1. Consider first
16 Notice incidentally that actual responders’ thresholds also change (modestly) with stake changes, which is again
consistent with our model. Evidence on these two points is surveyed in Camerer (2003, pp. 60–62).
(a) (5/5) Material game (b) (10/0) Material game
Fig. 4.
player 2’s behavior if she is offered ‘left’. Falk et al. (2003) find that 44.4% of the (8, 2) offers
are rejected in game (5/5) while only 8.9% of those are rejected in game (10/0).17 Furthermore,
proposers were able to anticipate the different rates of rejection. Around 30% of the proposers
offer (8, 2) in game (5/5) while almost 100% of the proposers offer (8, 2) in game (10/0).
The E-norm selects ’right’ in the (5/5) game because it leads to the fairest allocation. As a
result, offering (8, 2) constitutes a deviation from the E-norm in this game and hence activates
anger. Our model thus predicts that principled responders reject offer (8, 2)—assuming α is high
enough—and accept the right offer. Selfish responders, on the other hand, accept any offer. It then
follows that a selfish proposer’s move depends on her initial expectation μ that the opponent
is principled. She offers (8, 2) if μ is small enough and (5, 5) otherwise. Finally, principled
proposers offer the equal split if γ is large enough.
Contrary to the (5/5) game, the fairmax distribution of the (10/0) game is (8, 2). Hence, offer
(8, 2) is always accepted and this explains why offer (8, 2) is rejected at different rates in each
game.18 On the other hand, an offer of (10, 0) is unfair and very cheap to punish so that it is
always rejected by principled responders, whereas selfish ones are indifferent between accepting
or rejecting it.
As another illustration of the influence of non-chosen alternatives, consider the mini-best-shot
material game. Player 1 moves either ‘left’ (l) or ‘right’ (r); and then player 2 observes her move
and accepts (A) or rejects (R). Fig. 5 shows its material game tree, in which ρM > (1 − ρ)M
that is, ρ > 12 . A remarkable feature of this material game is that it has two fairmax paths: One
leads to allocation [ρM, (1 − ρ)M], the other one to allocation [(1 − ρ)M,ρM]. In games with
17 Brandts and Solà (2001) report similar results. See Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for more evidence and references on the
topic.
18 As we noted before, offer (8, 2) is rejected by a small minority of responders in game (10/0) so that our model is
inconsistent with that result. May this phenomenon be due to inequity aversion? To analyze this point with a bit of detail,
consider an individual decision problem in which the chooser must decide between two (self, other) material allocations:
(2, 8) and (0, 0). Note that, from a consequentialistic point of view, this is exactly the same problem that a responder faces
in the (10/0) game if the fair offer is made. However, and contrary to pure inequity aversion models, some experimental
evidence shows that the rate of choice of allocation (0, 0) differs significatively in both cases—basically, no subject
chooses (0, 0) in the non-strategic setting; see Charness and Rabin (2002) on this. All this seems to indicate that inequity
aversion is not the force motivating rejection of the (8, 2) offer in game (10/0).
Fig. 5. Mini-Best-Shot Material game.
multiple fairmax paths, the chooser at a decision node in which two or more fairmax paths diverge
has a strategic advantage: She can choose the fairmax path that favors her most without making
the opponents angry. This largely drives our predictions.
Proposition 7. The mini-best-shot game has a unique PBE strategy profile. Independently of
their types, player 1 chooses ‘right’, and player 2 rejects ‘left’ and accepts ‘right’.
Proof. Player 2 accepts ‘right’ and rejects ‘left’ because that is consistent with the E-norm and
maximizes material payoff. For the same reasons, player 1 offers ‘right’. 
Prasnikar and Roth (1992) study a best-shot game with a richer strategy space than the one we
analyze here. Their results, however, are still consistent with our predictions. This is specially true
concerning proposers. On the other hand, some responders prefer (0,0) than [ρM, (1 − ρ)M]—
something that our model cannot explain. Does this indicate that they are inequity averse? For
reasons that we mentioned before (consult the previous footnote), we doubt that. Furthermore,
it is convenient to note that Prasnikar and Roth (1992) also study behavior in a comparable
ultimatum game, and show that the rate of rejection of offer [ρM, (1 − ρ)M] is significatively
larger in the ultimatum game. This divergence in results cannot be explained by inequity aversion
models because they assume consequentialistic preferences—i.e., the only thing that agents care
about is how material resources are distributed, not how this distribution is achieved. Our model,
on the contrary, explains the divergence because offer [ρM, (1 − ρ)M] constitutes a deviation
from the E-norm in the ultimatum game, where the equal sharing is feasible, but not in the best-
shot game. Consequently, such offer makes the second mover angry in the ultimatum but not in
the best-shot game.
To sum up, the whole set of alternatives is important because people determine what is fair
by looking at that set. Consequently, an action may be fair in one context but not in another one
in which a more fair move is feasible. Since anger is activated by unfair moves, it follows that
punishment also depends on the initial set of alternatives.
Path-dependency and punishment: responsibility matters
In our model, responsibility becomes an important variable because sanctions are directed
only toward violators. Suppose, for instance, that agricultural output in a certain region has been
minimal because of low irrigation, and think of two possible scenarios: In one, the cause of low ir-
rigation was a heavy drought whereas in the other it was the incompetence of the agency in charge
of the irrigation channels. Although distributional consequences—low agricultural incomes—
may be identical in both cases, farmers are likely to anger at the agency in the latter scenario,
thus generating conflict, but not in the former one. In general, unfair outcomes may be the result
of Nature moves or third parties’ choices. Economic crisis in little countries, to give another ex-
ample, may be caused by policy choices made by big countries or international institutions, and
citizens’ response in this case is likely to be different that if the crisis is caused by bad economic
policy at the domestic level.
It is possible to test in the lab whether responsibility matters or not. Suppose, for instance, that
a computer generates randomly the proposer’s offer in an ultimatum game. Since the proposer
is not responsible of any deviation, the model predicts that no responder rejects (punishes) a
randomly chosen offer x. Thus lower rejections rates are predicted in the computer treatment
than in the typical, intentional treatment.
Blount (1995) was the first to provide experimental evidence on this regard.19 Our model is
consistent with Blount’s experimental data. Indeed, there is a significant and substantial reduc-
tion in the acceptance thresholds of responders in the computer treatment.20 Blount also studied
rejection rates in case a third party chooses the proposer’s offer. Interestingly, acceptance thresh-
olds in this condition did not differ significatively from those in the usual condition. Although
this seems inconsistent with our model, we believe that it can be easily accommodated. When
a third party chooses a sharing that favors either the proposer or the responder, that third party
violates the E-norm. The responder may then ‘punish’ the third party by rejecting that unfair
sharing.
The concept of responsibility is rather alien to consequentialistic models. Inequity aversion
models as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), for instance, predict that a
relatively well-off agent will always be sanctioned if punishment is cheap enough, whatever her
previous behavior. As a result, they predict no change in rejection rates between the computer
treatment and the typical, intentional treatment. On the contrary, models of intentions and type-
based reciprocity predict some change.
Punishment is not a means to reduce inequity
Models of altruistic motives like Charness and Rabin (2002) are unable to explain why people
punish. On the contrary, inequity aversion models—Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000)—do provide a rationale: Punishment is a means to reduce disadvantageous
material payoff inequality. For two-player games, this idea has a series of implications which we
will contrast in what follows with ours.
19 Blount’s results are problematic because, among other reasons, subjects were deceived in one of the treatments.
Further research shows, however, that Blount’s qualitative results are not an artifact of the experimental design. See Fehr
and Schmidt (2006) for a discussion.
20 Nevertheless, there exists a very small proportion of actual responders that reject low offers in the random treatment.
Again, see Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for a survey on this and related issues.
Fig. 6. Punishing a disadvantaged opponent.
First, inequity averse agents never punish an opponent that gets a lower payment than oneself.
On the opposite, we predict that a principled agent will punish any transgressor (including dis-
advantaged ones) if punishment is cheap enough. As an illustration, consider the material game
represented in Fig. 6. On one hand, player 2 can punish (at a cost) the first mover by choos-
ing R. On the other hand, player 2 gets a larger payoff than player 1 at any terminal node. Hence,
models of inequity aversion predict that any second mover would play A if given the choice. An
inequity averse first mover should then move l in order to get a larger material payoff and reduce
disadvantageous inequity.
Under certain conditions, our model makes completely opposite predictions. To understand
this, note that (5, 120) is the unique fairmax distribution unless parameter δ is very close to
one—i.e., the E-norm prescribes to play r . As a principled second mover would move R if his
anger parameter α is large enough, it follows that the first mover would then play r if μ is large
enough.
Models of inequity aversion also predict that punishment never takes place if it is so costly that
it does not reduce disadvantageous inequity. Suppose, for example, that reducing the opponent’s
payment in one monetary unit costs exactly one unit as well. Then no inequity averse agent would
punish the other player. On the contrary, we predict that a very aggressive principled player—
i.e., α = 1—would indeed punish a transgressor. Experimental evidence strongly supports our
prediction—see Falk et al. (2005) for details.
Finally, inequity aversion models predict some punishment toward an advantaged opponent if
it is cheap enough, and independently of her previous behavior. Our model is clearly at odds with
that idea because it predicts that only transgressors might be punished. Experimental evidence
seems to be at conflict too: In previously mentioned game Berk23 of Charness and Rabin (2002)
subject B chooses between (B , other) allocations of dollars (2, 8) and (0, 0). Inequity aversion
models predict that a significant proportion of subjects should choose (0, 0) in order to reduce
inequity. Contrary to that, all participants chose (2, 8).
Other games
All the games we have analyzed so far are 2-player games. As an example of a multiple-
player game, consider an ultimatum game with multiple proposers (the analysis here can be easily
extended to an ultimatum game with multiple responders). That is, n − 1 2 sellers (proposers)
make simultaneous price offers p1,p2, . . . , pn−1 to sell one unit of a good to a single buyer
(responder) who demands only one unit of the good. The buyer can accept the offer she prefers
or reject all of them. Assume that the responder values one unit of the good in V monetary units.
Hence, the responder’s monetary payoff if she accepts price offer pi (i ∈ {1,2, . . . , n − 1}) is
V −pi , whereas seller i’s income is pi—unsuccessful sellers get zero money. Finally, all players
get no money if the responder accepts no offer.
In order to study how players behave in equilibrium, assume that players’ types are common
knowledge (the analysis complicates if players’ types are private information, and it does not add
much insight). Note first that the E-norm selects just one fairmax path in this game: All sellers
choose the same price (V/2) and the responder accepts one of these offers. This is clearly efficient
and minimizes inequality between the worst-off player (an unsuccessful proposer) and the best-
off one. Therefore, a principled responder gets a utility payoff V/2 if at least one proposer i
makes a ‘fair’ price offer—i.e., pi = V/2—and the responder accepts it. On the contrary, she gets
a payoff of V − pi − αpi if she accepts an unfair offer—i.e., pi = V/2. In effect, the responder
will be angry at i because he deviated from the E-norm, and moreover she will feel no remorse in
that case because the E-norm allows any move once a deviation has been discovered. As a result,
a principled responder’s best response to any profile p1,p2, . . . , pn−1 is the following one: She
accepts a fair offer if at least one proposer made such offer and if any unfair offer pi = V/2
satisfies
pi >
V
2(1 + α) = p
∗,
and accepts the lowest unfair offer otherwise. On the other hand, it is clear that a selfish responder
will always choose the lowest price.
Further, one can prove that at least one proposer will choose a zero offer in equilibrium if there
are at least two selfish proposers (a selfish opponent would slightly undercut the lowest price offer
otherwise; the argument here is similar to that in a Bertrand duopoly game). On the other hand,
there exist multiple equilibrium paths if there is only one selfish proposer, or no selfish proposers.
For instance, an equilibrium path in which all proposers make a zero offer exists whatever the
number of selfish proposers (to understand this, recall that principled types feel no remorse if
everybody deviates from the norm). Another example appears when there is a single selfish
proposer, the responder is principled, and p∗ − ε − γ (n− 2) < −αp∗ ⇔ V2 − ε − γ (n− 2) < 0
for any ε > 0. In this equilibrium path, the selfish proposer offers pi = p∗ and all the principled
proposers respect the E-norm (an analogous equilibrium exists if the responder is selfish and
V − ε − γ (n − 2) < −α(V − ε) for any ε arbitrarily close to 0, but the selfish proposer offers
pi = V − ε in this case).
To sum up, the outcome is largely undetermined if there are less than two selfish proposers,
while the responder gets the whole surplus for sure otherwise. This latter result is largely con-
sistent with the available experimental evidence, specially if subjects are allowed to play the
game repeatedly; see the survey in Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p. 829). In López-Pérez (2007) we
have analyzed other games using a slightly different version of our model here, and compared
predictions with existing experimental data. The model there explains why people cooperate
conditionally in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, why first movers in a sequential social dilemma co-
operate significantly more than players of a simultaneous one, why cooperation in a Voluntary
Contribution Mechanism (VCM) public good game depends on the expectation that sufficiently
others will contribute as well, or why competitive markets induce principled people to behave as
self-interested ones do. In López-Pérez (2007), a fairmax distribution is defined as an allocation
maximizing function Q(x)—function (3). In other words, principled players care about a fairness
norm that depends on social efficiency and maximin—for that reason, it is called the EM-norm.
This difference is immaterial in two player games (which are our main focus in this paper), but
it could generate different predictions in multiple player games. For instance, the E-norm and
the EM-norm select different fairmax paths in the ultimatum game with multiple proposers. To
be precise, the EM-norm selects any price offer and commends the responder to accept always.
In effect, since there are at least 2 sellers and only one of them can be successful, it follows
that at least one seller gets the minimum possible payment—i.e., zero—at any allocation so that
all allocations are maximin. In addition, the EM-norm commends to accept any offer because
rejection is not socially efficient.
Which norm is more consistent with the experimental data coming from market games? When
principled types are assumed to care only about the EM-norm, an argument à la Bertrand shows
that in equilibrium at least one player makes a zero offer, thus ensuring that the responder gets
the whole surplus whatever the players’ types (this prediction is independent of the players’ types
because, as any offer is consistent with the EM-norm, principled types have the same incentives
as selfish ones). One can also show an analogous result for the ultimatum game with multiple
responders (see López-Pérez, 2007). As we have seen before, however, this prediction is also
shared by our model when the E-norm is the binding one (the only difference is that the E-norm
model predicts other equilibria when there are ‘few’ selfish players). Therefore, this market game
does not provide an unequivocal means to discriminate the two formulations. To repeat, more
experimental research is due on this issue.
Although for different reasons, VCM public good games do not allow either to discriminate.
The reason in this case is that both norms select the same fairmax path in this game, in which all
players contribute their whole endowments. As we mentioned before, our main equilibrium result
is that principled players contribute conditionally (see López-Pérez, 2007 for details), whereas
selfish types contribute zero. On the contrary, selfish types contribute in equilibrium if a pun-
ishment stage is added and hence aggregate contributions increase (this is consistent with the
available experimental evidence, see Fehr and Gächter, 2000). In that way, selfish agents prevent
being punished from angry principled co-players.21
6. Concluding remarks
We have shown that a large body of experimental evidence, including very different phenom-
ena like generous and punishing behavior, may be explained by a relatively simple utility theory
in which agents experience different emotional responses depending on how they and others act.
Roughly speaking, our claim is that aggressive emotions like anger and moral emotions like guilt
or shame are strong psychological forces that enforce reciprocity, understanding by that concept
two things: (1) people adhere to norms if they expect others to respect them as well, and (2) peo-
ple punish those who violate binding norms. Further, and since these emotions are activated by
deviations from the norm, they induce path-dependent preferences.
Because it is very simple, the E-norm we propose is also too unrealistic. On one side, a norm
that allows any move once a player transgresses it is a rather eccentric norm. Even if someone has
committed a misdeed, actual norms of fairness still commend to be kind with those who previ-
ously respected them, and that may heavily restrict the set of decent choices. Another important
issue is that societies have norms regulating revenge and punishment, something that the E-norm
21 A proof of this assertion can be asked to the author.
Fig. 7. A risky move.
does not consider. For instance, proportionality concerns are widespread—i.e., many people be-
lieve that the punishment imposed on a deviator should be proportional to the damage that her
deviation caused. In the words of the Hebrew scriptures, “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”
(Lex Talionis).22
Further, the E-norm has the problem that it is not strategic, that is, it makes prescriptions at any
information set h without taking into account what the mover at h expects others are subsequently
going to do. Due to this, the E-norm may commend a move that, if the other player is selfish, ends
up reaching a very unfair outcome. To illustrate this, consider the material game tree represented
in Fig. 7. As (3, 3) is the only fairmax allocation of this game, the E-norm commends player 1 to
move l. Nevertheless, a selfish player 2 would then choose action A so reaching outcome (0,4),
which is most unfair. We believe that many people would argue that, unless one were sure enough
that the opponent is a well-principled person who plays R, action r is at least as fair as action l.
All this can be introduced in the model.
As a further remark, assuming that the psychological cost triggered by a deviation does not
depend on the particular deviation one makes is extreme. It seems more reasonable to assume
that such cost grows with the undeserved harm our actions impose on the others. In particular,
actions leading to unfair outcomes that favor the opponent should not induce any remorse at
all. Further, one could add a hypothesis of nonlinearity and some heterogeneity which would be
useful, for instance, to replicate the fact that dictator game offers are usually scattered along the
interval [0,M/2].
This paper has concentrated on the study of fairness norms—i.e., norms regulating behavior in
order to reach a fair distribution of material resources. Nevertheless, the model is flexible enough
to include many other types of norms. Think of norms regulating dressing, eating, or commu-
nication. For instance, parents instruct their children that telling lies is, most of the cases, a bad
act that should embarrass them if performed. Accordingly, most of us feel badly when break-
ing that rule or anger at those who violate it. This emotional responses help to enforce sincere
22 Incidentally, this raises an interesting question: Do people punish because they display aggressive emotions or be-
cause they have internalized norms that commend to punish? In the second case, people would punish in order not to feel
ashamed or guilty. We have opted for the first specification, but our model allows to discriminate: A person who punishes
in order to prevent shame would punish only if sufficiently many others punish as well, while the same is not true for
someone who punishes out of anger.
communication, and this can be easily accommodated within the setting offered by this paper.
On the contrary, other models of social preferences and reciprocity are badly suited to explain
these phenomena because they define a ‘bad’ action—if they define it at all—only by making
reference to its expected material consequences; something that, obviously, communication does
not affect.
To finish, the field of application of our model should not be restricted to the lab. Indeed, social
norms and emotions strongly influence human action in many ‘real life’ settings like voting, law
compliance, bargaining, team performance, and conflict, to cite a few. The next step should go
in the direction of studying such influence—Lindbeck et al. (1999) is an example of this line of
research.
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Appendix A
As there are only two types of players in our model, it displays little heterogeneity. Although
this is convenient for modeling reasons, it reduces sometimes the predictive power of the model.
It is possible (and not very complex), however, to relax the assumption of common priors, and
posit instead heterogeneous priors.23 We indicate in what follows one possible way to do it, and
show how this could be used to better understand some experimental results.
Let μi denote the belief player i has about μ so that beliefs may be heterogeneous—i.e.,
μi = μj for some i = j—and mistaken—i.e., μi = μ. To simplify matters, we also assume that
all players believe (maybe incorrectly) that priors are homogeneous and correct. More formally,
if player i believes μi then i also holds the belief that μi is common knowledge. McKelvey and
Palfrey (1992) called a hypothesis of this sort an Egocentric model.
This assumption is tractable and convenient because it does not require us to define a new
solution concept. In effect, as player i believes that all players have common priors μi , we still
predict that she will play according to a PBE of the game with common priors μi . To obtain
behavioral predictions for any game, therefore, it suffices to find its PBEs as if priors were com-
mon.
As an application, consider how the Egocentric model affects our results in the Cournot
duopoly game. We saw that the existence of the cooperative equilibrium required a sufficiently
23 Some experimental evidence supports this point of view. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991), McKelvey and Palfrey (1992),
Offerman et al. (1996) and Sonnemans et al. (1999) are some examples. Offerman et al. (1996, pp. 838–839) remark that
to explain their results: “Not only is an altruism component needed in the utility function [. . . ], but also an equilibrium
concept which relaxes the assumption of accurate expectations.”
large common prior μ. When priors are heterogeneous, it is intuitive that the only principled
players who will follow the norm are those who have a large enough prior. More precisely, if i
is a principled firm with priors μi, she might produce qF only if 4(3 − μi)√μiGK . Finally,
heterogeneous priors also affect selfish firms’ choices. To see that, observe that because θ de-
pends positively on μ, a selfish agent i increases her choice qC = θqF as her prior μi increases.
In that way, we generate some behavioral heterogeneity from belief heterogeneity.
As another application, recall that we mentioned in the main text that participants in Cournot
lab games usually converge toward the non-cooperative equilibrium when they play repeatedly.
Although we do not pretend to offer any formal argument here (this would require a theory about
how players update their beliefs), one could speculate that convergence is the result of mistaken
priors: Participants who have initially large priors tend to update their beliefs and thus move to
the non-cooperative equilibrium.
One might also apply the Egocentric model to our results in the Centipede game. In the ego-
centric model, if player i has priors μi , then she plays according to a PBE of the game with
common priors μi . As a consequence, a pessimistic selfish player—i.e., a player with a relatively
low μi—will tend to terminate the game earlier than an optimistic one. This idea is completely
consistent with the evidence and tests that McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) provide.
As a final example, consider the ultimatum game. If players have heterogeneous beliefs, our
model predicts that selfish and principled proposers make large offers whenever her priors μi
surpass a certain level, which is different for selfish and principled types. Now, in almost any
experimental study the vast majority of offers is in the interval 40–50%. A possible interpretation
of this phenomenon is that subjects come to the lab with rather large priors μi . In fact, the
available evidence indicates that proposers tend to overestimate the actual proportion of people
that reject unfair offers—i.e., parameter μ.24
We finish with an speculative remark on this last statement. From our knowledge, there is
much experimental evidence (particularly from repeated games) that seems to indicate that av-
erage subjects overestimate parameter μ (is that prudence?). We believe that this issue would be
an interesting topic for experimental research.
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